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SMU Classification: Restricted
What are squeeze-outs and 
delistings?
• Squeeze out (in the form of compulsory 
acquisitions or schemes of arrangements) 
– bidder acquires 100% of target
• Delisting (followed by exit offers) – bidder 
procures the target to be delisted, followed 
by making an exit offer
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Summary of thesis
• Differences in how Hong Kong and 
Singapore regulate privatisations
• Impact of these differences
– Outcome to minority shareholders (empirical 
study on privatisations in Hong Kong and 
Singapore over 2008-2014 period)
– Interaction between privatisations and related 
party transactions (another form of tunneling)
• Explanation for the differences
• Normative implications
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Privatisations – The Theoretical 
Framework
• Coercive nature of privatisations, particularly by 
controlling shareholders
• Agency problem and the “law matters” thesis
– Conflict between controlling and minority shareholders 
(controlling shareholders choose timing and consideration)
– Versus privatisation may be value enhancing for controlling 
shareholders
• Interest group politics to explain the reasons for the 
differences
– Extending Armour and Skeel’s theory (Armour and Skeel, “Who 
Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers and Why? – The Peculiar 
Divergence of  US and UK Takeover Regulation” to jurisdictions 
with concentrated shareholdings?)
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Choice of jurisdictions
• We choose Hong Kong and Singapore to 
compare for the following reasons:
– Exploit the small but important differences in 
regulation (HK being more stringent in 
allowing privatisations, as compared to 
Singapore) and explain whether differences 
lead to substantive consequences
– Similar enforcement framework in the two 
jurisdictions
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Regulatory differences between HK 
and Singapore
Hong Kong Singapore
General offer 
followed by 
compulsory 
acquisition
 90% of offer shares 
AND 90% of 
disinterested shares
 90% cannot include 
shares held by bidder 
and associates or 
concert parties
 90% of offer shares
 90% cannot include 
shares held by bidder 
and related corporation 
(narrower than 
associates and concert 
parties) so room for 
arbitrage
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Regulatory differences between HK 
and Singapore
Hong Kong Singapore
Scheme of 
arrangement
 Pre-2014 – Majority in number 
representing 75% in value 
AND not more than 10% of 
disinterested shares cast votes 
against 
 Post-2014 - 75% in value AND 
not more than 10% of 
disinterested shares cast votes 
against
 Disinterested shares will mean 
that shares held by bidder and 
associates cannot count (note 
definition of associates not 
identical to the definition in 
general offers)
 Majority in number 
representing 75% in 
value
 Court has discretion 
to disapply the 
majority in number 
requirement
 75% cannot include 
shares held by bidder 
and concert parties 
(Takeover Code)
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Regulatory differences between HK 
and Singapore
Hong Kong Singapore
Delisting offer  75% vote of disinterested 
shares, present and 
voting and not more than 
10% of the disinterested 
shares voting against 
 Disinterested shares 
mean that shares held by 
bidder, CEO, controlling 
shareholders and their 
associates cannot count
 75% present and 
voting and not more 
than 10% voting 
against 
 No exclusion
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Dataset
• Privatisations of HK and Singapore listed  companies for 2008-2014 
period
• Focus on companies that are privatised by controlling shareholders 
(defined as holding 30% or more as at the date of offer, including 
holdings by concert parties)
• We examine premiums of offer price to volume weighted average 
price (1, 3, 6 and 12 months)
• Our approach is consistent with Subramanian (for US transactions) 
and Bugeja (for Australian transactions)*
*M Bugeja et al, “To scheme or bid? Choice of takeover method and impact on 
premium” (2015) Aust J of Mgt 1; G Subramanian, “Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: 
Theory and Evidence” (2007) 36 J of Legal Studies 1
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Summary of key findings
• Singapore has far more privatisations than Hong 
Kong, taking into account the respective sizes of the 
markets, and premium payable is significantly less 
than Hong Kong
• Significant arbitrage opportunities in Singapore 
using the general offers, with the effect that 
premium payable in arbitrage is significantly less 
than in non-arbitration cases
• Hong Kong has far higher intensity of related party 
transactions, compared with Singapore, which 
represents another form of tunnelling
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Findings – Difference in Outcomes
• Figure 1: Differences in frequencies and transaction structures
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Findings – Difference in outcomes
Figure 2: Privatisations by controlling and non-
controlling shareholders in each market
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Findings – Difference in outcomes 
(comparing VWAP) 
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Findings – Difference in outcomes (comparing 
arbitrage v. non-arbitrage cases in Singapore)
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Privatisations and related party 
transactions
• Related party transactions (RPTs), connected party transactions 
(CPTs, HK) and interested person transactions (IPTs, Singapore) 
• While they are not per se detrimental to the company or 
shareholders, minority shareholders are potentially prejudiced at two 
levels:
– Reduction in the net asset value of the company, and 
– Having been brought out at low prices. (See Du et al have found 
that in respect of Hong Kong privatisation transactions carried 
out between 1989 to 2008, controlling shareholders carry out 
self-dealing transactions that lead to low stock prices, and when 
remaining public is no longer attractive, controlling shareholders 
privatise and pay a low premium to minority shareholders). 
Du J, He Q & Yuen SW (2013) “Tunneling and the decision to go 
private: Evidence from Hong Kong” 22 Pacific Basin Finan. J. 50.
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Findings - Privatisations and RPTS
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• We test whether in each jurisdiction, squeeze-outs by controlling 
shareholders are preceded with significantly higher RPTs (or the  
associated CPTs and IPTs) as compared to squeeze-outs by non-
controlling shareholders.
• If so, it will suggest that there is a likelihood of expropriation by 
controlling shareholders, in addition to that suggested by the 
evidence relating to the premiums payable in squeeze-out 
transactions. 
• Using a two-sample t-test on our sample of Hong Kong squeeze-out 
transactions, we find that the mean amount of RPTs in the fiscal 
year preceding the squeeze-out transactions by controlling 
shareholders are (US$241.6million), which is statistically 
significantly higher than the mean amount of corresponding RPTs 
for squeeze-out transactions by non-controlling shareholders 
(US$112.44 million) (significant at 5% level). 
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Findings - Privatisations and RPTS
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• When we test the differences in the mean amount of CPTs in the 
fiscal year preceding the squeeze-outs transactions by controlling 
and non-controlling shareholders, we obtain similar results (CPTs 
being US$141.90 million and US$47.26, respectively, and the 
difference being significant at 5% level). Similar results are obtained 
after we put in controls for the size of the companies. 
• In Singapore, by contrast, we do not find statistical significance in 
respect of the difference between the mean amount of RPTs (or 
IPTs) in the fiscal year prior to squeeze-outs by controlling and non-
controlling shareholders, with or without controls for the size of the 
companies.
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Explanation for differences in regulation –
using interest group theory
• Singapore’s experience with compulsory 
acquisition provisions
– 2002 amendment
– 2008-2014 reforms to the Companies Act
• Hong Kong’s experience with compulsory 
acquisition provisions
– Influence of the press
– Greater participation by the retail market
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Explanation for differences in regulation –
using interest group theory
• Mode of regulation
– Singapore views matters of compulsory 
acquisition as reserved for the legislature
– Hong Kong’s non-legislative solution (eg
takeover regulation and stock exchange rules 
take the lead) 
• Mode of regulation leads to substantive 
differences in regulation
– Legislation (requires certainty and 
predictability)
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Normative conclusions
• Higher premium in HK market may not 
mean that shareholders are better off:
– Less offers
– Potentially other kinds of tunnelling occur
• Arbitrage and delisting offers in Singapore 
of particular concerns to minority 
shareholder protections 
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